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ET'S TALK 
J d c De o e Co Co 
ANNA PAULM. TOM and lORI A. RINGHAND 
As part of the checks and balances 
that are a hallmark of the American 
political system, presidential nomi-
nees to the U.S. Supreme Court must 
be confirmed by the Senate. To facili-
tate its role of providing the president 
The authors extend their gratitude to Bryan 
Calvin, Nathan Goodrich, Nick jones, Alexan-
der King, and jonathan Milby for their excellent 
research assistance and to Bethany Blackstone and 
Lisa Solowiej for their comments. Collins and Ring-
hand thank the Dirksen Congressional Center for a 
research grant that partially funded the data used 
in this project. Any errors in fact or judgment are 
solely the responsibility of the authors. 
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with advice and consent, in 1816 the 
Senate created the Committee on the 
Judiciary. In 1939, Felix Frankfurter 
became the first Supreme Court 
nominee to take unrestricted ques-
tions from members of the Judiciary 
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Committee in a public hearing. While 
nominees appointed immediately 
after Frankfurter testified before 
the Committee only sporadically, in 
1955 nominee testimony became the 
norm. Since the appointment of John 
Harlan, all appointees whose nomina-
tions were officially submitted to the 
Senate have appeared before the Judi-
ciary Committee.1 
While Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee hearings have the potential to 
provide both a check on the president's 
appointment authority and a means 
to hold potential justices democrati-
cally accountable, the hearings are 
routinely criticized as being devoid of 
any real substantive content.2 Despite 
the fact that this sentiment has seemed 
to reach the status of conventional 
wisdom, there has been very little sys-
tematic research on the content of the 
hearings themselves.3 Consequently, 
with few exceptions, our understand-
ing of the substance of the hearings is 
primarily based on anecdotal accounts 
of hearing testimony, rather than the 
rigorous analysis of what actually tran-
spires at the hearings. 
To remedy this state of affairs, we 
investigate one particularly impor-
tant aspect of the hearings: the extent 
to which hearing dialogue is moti-
vated by the discussion of judicial 
decisions. In so doing, we address a 
series of interrelated questions: How 
much hearing testimony is devoted to 
the treatment of judicial decisions? 
Do senators or nominees address 
judicial decisions more frequently? 
Which court's decisions are most 
commonly debated? How old are the 
court cases scrutinized at the hear-
ings? Which issue areas provoke dis-
cussion of precedent? Do these issue 
areas vary depending on the political 
party of the senator interrogating the 
nominee? 
Understanding the discussion of 
judicial decisions at Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings is important for 
several reasons. First, at the most basic 
level, this analysis provides insight into 
whether any generalized claims can be 
made about the confirmation process.4 
By demonstrating that a substantial 
portion of hearing dialogue involves 
the concrete discussion of judicial 
decisions, this research contributes to 
the view that the confirmation process 
is a core part of our governing system. 
As such, this work speaks directly to 
the question of whether the hearings 
have substantive content independent 
of opportunities for senators to score 
political points by probing the idiosyn-
crasies of individual nominees, such as 
asking abstract and relatively mean-
ingless questions about their preferred 
methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Second, because respect for prec-
edent is a cornerstone of the American 
common law system, investigating 
the treatment of judicial decisions at 
the confirmation hearings provides 
a window into how constitutional 
change is driven by a common-law 
methodology, illustrating the impor-
tance nominees and senators attach to 
the acceptance (or rejection) of exist-
ing case law. Because nominees are 
rarely willing to violate the norm of 
not forecasting their positions on legal 
disputes they might encounter, should 
they be confirmed to the Court,S taking 
the confirmation process seriously 
requires examining what nominees are 
willing to say about previously decided 
constitutional cases. By interrogating 
nominees on past decisions, senators 
are provided insight into the nominees' 
positions on prominent legal issues 
without pressing them to divulge how 
they might rule on future disputes.6 
Third, this research contributes to our 
understanding of the impact of court 
cases by demonstrating how judicial 
decisions motivate senatorial ques-
tioning at the hearings. Thus, rather 
than starting from a blank slate in their 
questioning, we reveal that senators 
utilize existing case law to probe nomi-
nees as to their positions on a diverse 
array of issue areas. Fourth, analyzing 
the age of the cases canvassed at the 
hearings contributes to our under-
standing of whether hearing dialogue 
reflects the salient legal issues of the 
time period corresponding to the con-
firmation hearing. On the one hand, 
if the cases discussed at the hearings 
are centuries-old, this suggests that 
the hearings may not be relevant to 
contemporary legal discourse. On the 
other hand, if the cases debated at the 
hearings are relatively recent, this pro-
vides evidence that hearing colloquy 
closely represents the contemporary 
3. But see, e.g., Dion Farganis and justin 
Wedeking, "No Hints, No Forecasts, No Previews": 
An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Nominee 
Candor From Harlan to Kagan, 45 L. & Soc. REV. 
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39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329 (2010). For an analy-
sis of lower court confirmation hearings see 
concerns of members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and, by implica-
tion, the Americans they represent. 
Finally, unearthing variation in the 
issue areas implicated in the discus-
sion of judicial decisions with respect 
to the political party of the senator 
questioning the nominee enhances our 
appreciation of the role of partisanship 
in the judicial selection process. 
Taken as a whole, this research 
makes a novel contribution to our 
understanding of the Supreme Court 
confirmation process, the impact 
of court decisions, and the partisan 
nature of federal judicial selection. As 
noted above, though there has been 
no shortage of ink spilled on discus-
sions of the Supreme Court confir-
mation process, there has been very 
little systematic research devoted 
to understanding the content of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. 
This line of inquiry began more than 
two decades ago when Watson and 
Stookey7 rigorously analyzed the hear-
ings and demonstrated that senators 
pursue varying goals that influence 
the nature and tone of their question-
ing. Since that seminal contribution, 
scholars have addressed other aspects 
of the hearings. Following Robert 
Bork's controversial nomination, Guli-
uzza, Reagan, and Barrett8 sought to 
examine whether that hearing marked 
a pivotal shift in the types of questions 
asked of nominees. Though they failed 
to find any major changes in nominee 
questioning, a subsequent analysis 
by Ogundele and Keith9 evidenced 
subtle shifts in the post-Bork era, such 
Logan Dancey, Kjersten Nelson, and Eve Rings-
muth, "Strict scrutiny?" The content of Senate 
judicial confirmation hearings during the George 
W. Bush administration, 95 JUDICATURE 126 
(2012). 
4. For assertions to the contrary, see Martin 
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Appointments, 85 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 935 
(1989-1990), at 935 (stating that "any claim to 
scientific generalization about Supreme Court 
appointments is highly dubious"). 
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7. George Watson and john Stookey, Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings: a view from the 
Senate, 71 JUDICATURE 186 (1988). 
8. Guliuzza, Reagan, and Barrett, supra note 3. 
9. Ogundele and Keith, supra note 3. 
as an increase in questioning nomi-
nees on their constitutional philoso-
phies. More recent scholarship on the 
hearings has focused on the types of 
questions asked by senators and the 
nominees' responses. For example, 
Ringhand and CollinslO analyzed the 
issues addressed in senatorial inqui-
ries and nominee responses, including 
whether these issues vary depending 
on attributes of the nominees, such 
as their race or gender. Farganis and 
Wedekingll have expanded this effort 
by examining nominee candor, finding 
few changes over time with respect to 
the willingness of nominees to answer 
the senators' questions. In the only 
previous study of the role of judicial 
decisions at the hearings, Williams 
and BaumI2 analyzed the extent to 
which senators probe nominees on 
their previous judicial decisions and 
the tone of their questions. Below, we 
contribute to this limited, but impor-
tant vein of research by more fully 
exploring the discussion of judicial 
decisions at the hearings. 
The Discussion of Judicial Decisions 
To investigate the extent to which 
judicial decisions are discussed at the 
hearings, we collected data on every 
question asked and answer given 
at every open, transcribed, public 
Supreme Court confirmation hearing 
from 1939-2010.13 This represents 
the universe of confirmation hear-
ings at which nominees testified and 
is thus the most expansive analysis 
of confirmation hearing dialogue to 
10. Ringhand and Collins, supra note 1. 
11. Farganis and Wedeking, supra note 3. See 
also Wedeking and Farganis, supra note 3. 
12. Williams and Baum, supra note 3. 
13. We obtained transcripts of the confirma-
tion hearings from five sources. The transcripts 
of the early hearings, Frankfurter (1939) to 
Blackmun (1970), are found in Roy M. Mersky 
and j. Myron jacobstein, eds., THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND 
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL 
NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY 
THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1975 
(Buffalo: William S. Hein, 1977). The tran-
scripts of Powell (1971) through Alito (2006) 
are available on the Senate judiciary Com-
mittee's webpage (http://www.senate.gov/ 
pagelayout/reference/one_item_and_teasers/ 
Supreme_Court_Nomination_Hearings.htm). 
The Bork (1987) transcript is found on the 
Law Library of Congress's webpage (http:// 
www.loc.gov/law/find/court-withdrawn.php). 
The Sotomayor transcri pt is available from 
date. The unit of analysis in the data is 
the change of speaker. As such, a new 
observation begins whenever the 
speaker changes (e.g., from senator 
to nominee). Our data identify each 
judicial decision named in a state-
ment, the name of each decision, the 
court that decided each case, and the 
date each decision was handed down. 
While most statements reference a 
lone court case, on occasion, a single 
comment may identify several cases. 
In such instances, each case is coded 
separately. In addition, we coded the 
party of the senator asking the ques-
tion and the issue area correspond-
ing to the discussion of the decision 
(which we address further below). 
We coded all situations in which a 
statement by a nominee or senator 
unambiguously references a named 
case as involving the discussion of that 
case, even if the nominee or senator 
does not identify the case in a given 
comment. For example, if a question 
by a senator asks about a specific case, 
and the nominee discusses the case 
without repeating its name, the nomi-
nee's statement is coded to reflect 
the fact that it involved the judicial 
decision, despite the fact the decision 
was not specifically identified by the 
nominee. Statements regarding an 
issue area commonly associated with 
a particular case, such as abortion 
and Roe v. Wade,14 are not coded as 
involving a decision unless the state-
ments are made in reference to a judi-
cial decision. 
To illustrate, consider the following 
the New York Times (http://www.nytimes. 
com/2 009/07 /14/us/politics/14confirm-text. 
html?J=l&pagewanted=all). The Kagan tran-
script is available from the Washington Post 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp -srv / 
package/supremecourt/2 0 1 Ocan didates / elena-
kagan.html). Because we are concerned with 
the question and answer sessions that are the 
heart of the confirmation hearings, we have 
excluded opening statements made by nominees 
and senators. In addition, we have excluded the 
portion of the Clarence Thomas hearing that was 
re-opened solely for the purpose of investigating 
allegations of sexual harassment made by Anita 
Hill since that testimony is qualitatively differ-
ent than traditional hearing dialogue. 
14.410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief 
Justice of the United States, at 192 (http://www. 
gpo.gov /fdsys/pkg/G PO- CH RG- REHN QUIST / 
pdf/GPO-CHRG-REHNQUIST.pdf). 
16.310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
exchange between Senator Specter 
(R-PA) and Justice William Rehnquist 
at Rehnquist's hearing for Chief 
Justice in 1986: 
Senator SPECTER. Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist, at the risk of asking ques-
tions which may come before the 
Court. I think these are pretty well 
established principles, but, there is 
considerable concern on the part of 
this Senator about the applicability 
of the due process clause of the 14th 
amendment to certain fundamental 
liberties, as embodied in the first 10 
amendments. And I would like to ask 
your view as to the inclusion of the free 
exercise of religion in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut. It was a unanimous opinion. 
Does that matter rest, so far as you are 
concerned? 
Justice REHNQUIST. Most certainly, 
yes.15 
Given our coding rubric, both 
of these statements are treated as 
having referenced the Supreme 
Court's decision in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut,16 despite the fact Rehnquist 
did not specifically name Cantwell in 
his response. Such is the case because 
both comments concern themselves 
with whether Rehnquist accepts 
Cantwell's principle of incorporating 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment against the states. 
We begin our examination of the 
discussion of judicial decisions at the 
confirmation hearings by investigat-
ing the extent to which such decisions 
make their way into hearing dialogue. 
Figure 1 identifies the percentage of 
statements related to judicial deci-
sions for each nominee. The nominees 
are arrayed along the vertical y-axis, 
while the horizontal x-axis reports 
the percentage of all statements at 
each hearing involving judicial deci-
sions. Statements made by senators 
appear in the left-hand graph, while 
nominee comments appear in the 
right-hand graph. 
Overall, 16% of hearing dialogue 
involves the specific discussion of 
judicial decisions, with 15% of sena-
torial comments referencing prece-
dents and 17% of nominee comments 
doing the same. As such, the identity of 
the speaker (i.e., senator or nominee) 
makes little difference in the canvass-
FIGURE 1, The Percentage of Comments Made hy Senators and 
Nominees Discussing Jndicial Decisions at the Senate Judicial'Y Committee 
Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939-2010 
Frankfurter (1939) 
Jackson (1941) 
Harlan (1955) 
Brennan (1957 
Whittaker (1957) 
stewart (1959) 
White (1962) 
Goldberg (1962) 
Fortasl1965) 
Marshall 1967) 
Fortas (1965) 
Thornberry (1968) 
Senators 
Hay.::g~~ g~~ Piiiii-----
carswell (1970) 
Blackmun \1970) 
Powell 1971) 
Rehnquist (1971) 
stevena 11975) 
O'COnnor 1981) 
Rehnquist 1986) =~;:::.... ........ Scalia 11965) 
Scrk 1987) 
Kennedy 1987 
Scuter(1990) ~~~~~~_ Thomas (1991) Ginsburg (1993) Breyer (1994) 
Roberts \20051 Alito 2006 
Sctomayor 2009 
Kagan (2010 
o 10 20 30 40 
ing of judicial decisions. In fact, the 
correlation between the percentage 
of senatorial statements addressing 
precedents and that of nominees at 
each hearing is 0.99 (p < 0.001). Thus, 
the structure of our data corroborate 
the reality that the hearings take place 
in a question and answer format, with 
senators setting the hearing agenda 
through their questions, followed by 
nominees responding in turn. 
Figure 1 also reveals that there is 
substantial variation in the discussion 
of judicial decisions at the hearings. 
No judicial decisions were brought up 
at three of the early hearings-those 
of Jackson (1941), Brennan (1957), 
and White (1962)-and less than 4% 
of dialogue at the Frankfurter (1939), 
Harlan (1955), and Goldberg (1962) 
hearings involved debates over prec-
edents. It is thus apparent that the 
discussion of judicial decisions did 
not take foothold until the Marshall 
hearing in 1967. Beginning with Mar-
shall, 20% of all comments at the 
hearings involved the treatment of 
judicial decisions. Moreover, dialogue 
relating to court cases played a par-
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ticularly prominent role at the hear-
ings of Marshall (1967), Fortas (for 
Chief Justice in 1968), Thornberry 
(1968), Haynsworth (1969), Ginsburg 
(1993), and Roberts (2005). At each 
of these hearings, more than 30% of 
all statements involved the analysis of 
judicial decisions, ranging from 31 % 
for Thornberl'Y to a high of 39% for 
Fortas. Thus, while it took the discus-
sion of judicial decisions some time 
to gain traction, once it did, inqui-
ries related to specific precedents 
have become a mainstay of hearing 
colloquy. In the last two decades, 
more than 25% of hearing discourse 
involved senators interrogating nomi-
nees on specific judicial decisions. 
The Courts 
Having established the extent to 
which judicial decisions are discussed 
at Supreme Court confirmation hear-
ings, we now turn to identifying the 
courts that rendered the decisions 
that make their way into the hearings. 
This information is presented in Table 
1. The first column lists the court 
type, the second column identifies the 
percentage of statements pertaining 
to the decisions of each court, and 
the third column reports the percent-
age of unique cases canvassed at the 
hearings for each court type. 
Beginning with column two, it is 
evident that, far and away, the major-
ity of judicial decisions discussed at 
the hearings involve the decisions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, more 
than 6,100 separate statements impli-
cated Supreme Court cases, compris-
ing almost 72% of all judicial decisions 
discussed. That so much focus is given 
to Supreme Court decisions is not sur-
prising for two reasons. First, because 
the Supreme Court sits atop the judi-
cial hierarchy, its precedents bind the 
decisions of all lower courts and thus 
weigh more heavily than precedents 
set by lower federal and state courts. 
Second, because senators can utilize 
the discussion of the Court's prec-
edents to interrogate nominees as to 
their positions on those precedents, 
without requiring the nominees to 
forecast their positions on pending or 
potential cases, querying nominees on 
Supreme Court precedents provides 
a powerful mechanism for senators 
to glean the nominees' positions on 
seemingly settled legal disputes. 
Following the Supreme Court, 
decisions handed down by the U.S. 
courts of appeals constitute 25% of 
all court cases addressed at the hear-
ings. As Williams and Baum17 point 
out, the federal circuit courts have 
become fertile sources of Supreme 
Court nominees in recent decades. 
For example, of the justices sitting 
on the current Court, only one, Elena 
Kagan, has not served on one of the 
courts of appeals. Given that senators 
will frequently probe nominees on 
their previous judicial decisions,18 and 
given that a majority of the nominees 
in our dataset served on the courts of 
appeals, it makes sense that a substan-
tial portion of the judicial decisions 
addressed at the confirmation hear-
ings come from these courts. Notably, 
however, the fact that the vast major-
ity of decisions discussed come from 
the Supreme Court, not the appeals 
courts where nominees have served, 
demonstrates that the hearings do 
more than rehash the nominees' prior 
judicial pronouncements. 
Decisions handed down by the 
other courts identified in Table 1 
are examined relatively infrequently. 
Only 2% of all mentions of judicial 
decisions involve cases disposed of 
by the federal district courts, while 
only 1.3% address precedents set by 
state high courts. Moreover, only five 
statements pertain to the decisions 
of state trial courts and only three 
involve the decisions of state inter-
mediate appellate courts. Interest-
ingly, one case decided by a foreign 
judicial body made an appearance 
at the hearings: Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom. 19 In Dudgeon, the European 
Court of Human Rights determined 
that a law criminalizing male homo-
sexual sodomy ran afoul of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. 
This case was discussed at Anthony 
Kennedy's hearing in relation to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers 
v. Hardwick,20 which upheld a Georgia 
statute outlawing sodomy. Also of 
interest is the fact that a case from 
a U.S. Department of Defense mili-
tary commission made its way into 
17. Williams and Baum, supra note 3, at 74. 
18. Williams and Baum, supra note 3. 
19. Series A, No. 45 (1981). 
20.478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
22.381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
23.384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
TABtE 1 The Judicial Decisions Discussed at the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Conrt Nominees by Court 
~:pe, 1939-2li1t1.J 
Court 
U.S. Supreme Court 
State Trial Courts 
State Intermediate Appellate Courts 
Totals 
Percentage of 
Statements 
71.9% (6,138) 
24.6% (2,101) 
2.0% (173) 
U%{l13) 
0.06% (5) 
0.05% (4) 
0.04% (3) 
il.Ol%(1} 
100.0% (8,538) 
Percentage of Unique 
Cases Discussed 
65.5% (578) 
3.4% (30) 
0.3% (3) 
100.0% (882) 
The entries in column two represent the percentage of statements discussing a decision from each court as a function of all comments regarding 
judicial decisions, while the numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of statements pertaining to the decisions of each court. The entries 
in column three represent the percentage of unique cases from each court discussed as a function of all unique cases addressed at the hearings, 
while the numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of unique decisions from each court mentioned at the hearings. 
the hearings. During the Sotomayor 
hearing, Senator Graham (R-SC) 
brought up the case of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, who was scheduled to 
appear before a military tribunal on 
the third day of Sotomayor's testi-
mony to face charges related to his 
alleged involvement in terrorist activ-
ities (the case is still pending). 
Column three of Table 1 reports the 
percentage of unique cases addressed 
at the hearings for each court type. 
Among the more than 6,100 men-
tions of Supreme Court decisions, 
these discussions focused on 578 
cases, comprising 66% of all unique 
cases broached at the hearings. Thus, 
on average, each Supreme Court 
precedent addressed at the hear-
ings appears in about 10 comments. 
However, this average is deceiving 
because four cases make up more than 
20% of the discussion of Supreme 
Court precedent: Roe v. Wade (7.7%), 
Brown v. Board of Education 21 (5.2%), 
Griswold v. Connecticut22 (4.2%), and 
Miranda v. Arizona23 (4.0%). As such, 
it is apparent that particularly salient 
decisions, such as these four, regularly 
make their way into hearing discourse. 
Of the U.S. Courts of Appeals cases 
debated at the hearings, 239 separate 
cases are represented, compared to 
30 unique decisions from the federal 
district courts, 28 from state courts of 
last resort, three from state interme-
diate appellate courts, two from state 
trial courts, and a single decision each 
from the European Court of Human 
Rights and U.S. military tribunals. 
Thus, it is clear that the discussion of 
judicial decisions at Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings is dominated 
by Supreme Court precedents. 
The Age of Cases 
We now turn to an investigation of 
the age of the cases debated at the 
hearings. This analYSis is valuable 
in that it provides insight into the 
extent to which the discussion of judi-
cial decisions reflects contemporary 
debates over the salient legal issues 
corresponding to the time period 
surrounding the nomination. This 
information is presented in Figure 
2. This figure reports the age of the 
case in years, which was calculated 
by subtracting the date the decision 
was handed down from the date of 
FIGURE 2~ 'fhe Age of Cases lliscussed at the Senate Jndicial'¥' (lommittee 
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the confirmation hearing. The ver-
tical y-axis reports the number of 
times each case was mentioned at 
the hearings, while the horizontal 
x-axis represents the age of the case. 
To facilitate a visual understanding of 
the age of cases, we employ two-year 
bins in Figure 2. Thus, each vertical 
bar in the graph represents a two-
year time period. The black line rep-
resents the fitted normal distribution 
of the age of cases. 
Note that, in creating this figure, 
we excluded pending cases from con-
sideration. While rare, from time to 
time senators will query nominees 
on cases that have yet to be decided. 
In the data under analysis, nine cases, 
comprising 16 statements, were dis-
cussed before a final decision was ren-
dered. For example, Senator Feingold 
(D-WI) questioned Sonia Sotomayor 
about Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Cornrnission 24 six months before 
it was decided. Sotomayor declined 
to offer her opinion about the case, 
which was one of the first decisions 
handed down during her freshman 
term on the Court. 
The average age of the cases debated 
at the hearings is 19.4 years. However, 
Figure 2 reveals that this average does 
not tell the full story of the age of cases. 
In particular, the graph in Figure 2 is 
heavily skewed towards more recent 
cases: 24% of cases mentioned are 
less than two years old and 39% are 
less than four years old. The median 
age of cases is 7.8 years, meaning that 
50% of cases addressed at the hear-
ings are less than eight years old, and 
more than 75% of cases are less than 
23 years old. It is thus apparent that, 
while nominees are queried on a 
handful of seminal centuries-old cases, 
such as Marbury v. Madison 25 (84 com-
ments) and Dred Scott v. Sanford26 (60 
statements), most of the case-specific 
discussion reflects more recent judi-
cial decisions, with a majority of cases 
discussed being less than a decade old. 
Given this, these data provide strong 
evidence that debates over judicial 
decisions closely reflect issues of con-
temporary relevance to the American 
legal system. 
The Issues 
We conclude our empirical analysis of 
the discussion of judicial decisions at 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings 
by analyzing the issue areas raised 
in the canvassing of court cases. Our 
purpose is to shed light on the sub-
stantive content of the hearings by 
examining which issues most fre-
quently motivate the discussion of 
judicial decisions, as well as whether 
these issues vary depending on the 
political party of the questioning 
senator. To do this, we coded the state-
ments relating to the discussion of 
judicial decisions based on the topics 
in the Policy Agendas Project,27 sup-
plemented by the addition of several 
hearing-specific categories.28 Note 
that the issue area corresponds to the 
context of the statement. While most 
of these topics reflect the issue area of 
the judicial decision, they need not do 
so if the case was named in a context 
other than that involving the subject 
matter of the litigation. In addition, we 
coded the political party of the senator 
asking the question at the time of the 
confirmation hearing.29 
To illustrate, consider the dia-
logue between Senator Metzenbaum 
(D-OH) and Judge Robert Bork, involv-
ing Bork's role in the firing of Water-
gate Special Prosecutor Archibald 
Cox. 
24.175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010). 
25.5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
26.60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
27. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, 
Policy Agendas Project (http://www.policya-
gendas.org). The topiCS consist of macroeco-
nomics; civil rights; health; agriculture; labor 
and employment; education; environment; 
energy; transportation; law, crime, and family; 
social welfare; community development and 
housing; banking, finance, and domestic com-
merce; defense; space, technology, and com-
munications; foreign trade; international affairs 
and aid; government operations; public land 
and public water; state and local government; 
weather; fires; arts and entertainment; sports 
and recreation; death notices; and churches and 
religion. 
28. We added the following hearing-spe-
cific categories to the topics contained in the 
Policy Agendas Project database: federalism; 
court administration; statutory interpretation; 
best/favorite justices; best/favorite cases or 
opinions; worst cases or opinions; standing/ 
access to courts; non-standing justiciability 
issues; judicial philosophy; hearing administra-
tion; nominee background; media coverage of 
the hearing; and pre-hearing conversations/ 
coaching. 
29. This information was collected from the 
Biographical Directory of the United State Con-
gress, 1774-Present (http://bioguide.congress. 
gov). 
Senator METZENBAUM. ". The court 
in Nader v. Bork stated, "The firing 
of Archibald Cox in the absence of a 
finding of extraordinary impropriety 
was in clear violation of an existing 
Justice Department regulation having 
the force of law and was, therefore, 
illegal." So when you say it was not, 
you are saying that the court's decision 
meant nothing. 
Judge BORK. I did not say it meant 
nothing. I think it is wrong, Senator, 
and I will be glad to explain why I think 
50,30 
Because these statements pertain 
to Bark's role in the firing of Cox when 
he was Acting Attorney General, these 
comments are coded as involving 
"nominee background" despite the 
fact that Nader v. Bork31 focused on 
the limits of executive power. Thus, 
while it is rare for the issue area cor-
responding to the judicial decision 
to differ from that of the hearing 
testimony, it does happen on occa-
sion, typically in relation to inquiries 
regarding a nominee's background.32 
Table 2 presents the issues 
addressed in discussions of judicial 
decisions at Supreme Court confir-
mation hearings. The first column 
presents the issue area; the second 
column indicates the percentage of 
comments made by Democratic sena-
tors; the third column reports the 
percentage of statements made by 
Republican senators; and the fourth 
column reports the p-values corre-
sponding to two-tailed, unpaired dif-
ference of means tests. To facilitate 
interpretation, the p-values appear-
ing in bold indicate that the difference 
of means in the issue areas discussed 
by Democratic and Republican sena-
tors is statistically significant at p < 
0.05, meaning there are substantive 
differences between Democratic and 
Republican senators with respect 
to the attention given to these issue 
areas. 
Far and away, statements discuss-
ing judicial decisions involve civil 
rights issues. Overall, 51% of com-
ments relating to court cases touch on 
civil rights, with 59% of statements 
initiated by Republican senators 
to civil rights, compared to 
46% for Democratic senators.33 Dis-
cussions of judicial decisions in the 
context of debates about law, crime, 
and family are the next most fre-
quently addressed issue area, consti-
tuting 14% of statements inaugurated 
by Democratic senators and 8% by 
Republican senators. While law, crime 
and family is a seemingly broad cat-
egory, it is absolutely dominated by 
criminal justice issues, including the 
examination of cases such as Miranda 
v. Arizona, Escobedo v. Illinois,34 and 
Stovall v. Denno.35 Statements about 
judicial philosophy come next, with 
Republican senators inquiring about a 
nominee's judicial philosophy in 13% 
of comments involving cases, com-
pared to 8% for Democratic senators. 
Given that prior research indicates 
that specific, case-driven discussions 
are more illuminating of future judi-
cial behavior than are abstract ques-
tions of judicial philosophy,36 the fact 
that judicial philosophy plays a rela-
tively small role in confirmation dia-
3~. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomina-
tion of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, at 194 
(http://www.loc.gov/law/find/nominations/ 
borkjhearing-pt1.pdf). 
31. 366 F.Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1973). 
32. Another example of this is the series of 
questions William Rehnquist received at his 
1986 hearing involving a memo he wrote as a law 
clerk for Justice Jackson that supported uphold-
ing the separate but equal doctrine established 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
33. Because our data reflect the fact that 
senators set the hearing agenda through their 
questions, the data in Table 2 are separated 
logue, particularly in the discussion of 
cases, further demonstrates that the 
hearings are more substantive than is 
often asserted. 
Democratic senators more fre-
quently press nominees on judicial 
decisions with regard to questions 
involving the nominees' backgrounds, 
with 12% of background discussions 
relating to court cases initiated by 
Democratic senators, in contrast to 
only 5% for Republican senators. 
Democratic senators also focus more 
attention on government operations, 
labor and employment, and "other" 
issues in their discussion of judicial 
decisions, while Republican senators 
devote more attention to matters of 
statutory interpretation when scruti-
nizing nominees on their opinions of 
court cases. There are no significant 
differences between Democratic and 
Republican senators in terms of treat-
ments of federalism, hearing admin-
istration, court administration, and 
standing/access to courts. 
It is thus clear that the senators' 
political party affiliations playa role 
with regard to the topics motivating 
the discussion of judicial decisions. 
Republican senators probe nominees 
on matters of civil rights, judicial phi-
losophy, and statutory interpretation 
more often than their Democratic 
counterparts. Conversely, Democratic 
members of the Judiciary Committee 
focus more attention on issues relat-
ing to law, crime, and family, nominee 
background, government opera-
tions, labor and employment, and 
"other" issue areas. On the one hand, 
this corroborates existing research 
evincing that the Democratic Party 
"owns" some issues, such as labor and 
employment, while the Republican 
Party stakes a claim to others, such 
by the political party of the senator asking the 
question and include both the senators' ques-
tions and the nominees' responses. When we 
exclude statements made by nominees from our 
data, we obtain consistent results with respect 
to the differences in the issue areas discussed by 
Democratic and Republican senators. 
34.378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
35.388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
36. Jason J. Czarnezki, William K. Ford, and 
Lori A. Ringhand, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Confirmation Hearings of the justices of the 
Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY 127 (2007). 
TABLE 2" The Issues .!\ddressed in the Discussion of Judicial Decisions by 
the Par~ of the Senator at the Senate Jndiciary Committee Confirmation 
Hearings of Su~reme Court Nominees, 1939-2010 
Civil Rights 
Totals 
Democratic 
Senators 
45.7% (2,308) 
100.1 % (5,054) 
Republican 
Senators 
59.0% (2,055) 
100.1 % (3,484) 
P-value 
for t-test 
< 0.001 
The entries in columns two and three represent the percentage of comments regarding each issue area related to the discussion of judicial 
decisions. The do not sum to 100% due to rounding. The numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of comments pertaining to 
each issue area. The in column four report the p-values corresponding to two-tailed, unpaired difference of means tests for Democratic and 
Republican senators. P~value entries appearing in bold indicate that the difference of means is statistically significant at p < 0.05. Issue areas 
representing less than 1.0% of the topics implicated in the discussion of judicial decisions are combined into the "Other Issues" category. 
as judicial philosophy and statutory 
interpretation.37 On the other hand, in 
their discussion of judicial decisions, 
Democratic senators more frequently 
press nominees on several issues 
that are traditionally associated with 
the Republican Party, including law, 
crime, and family, while Republican 
senators press nominees more often 
on civil rights, generally thought to 
be an issue owned by the Democratic 
Party.38 
Thus, while there is some cor-
respondence with issue ownership 
theory in the context of presidential 
elections, it is evident that members 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
are willing to appropriate issues tra-
ditionally associated with the oppo-
sition party when grilling Supreme 
Court nominees about judiCial deci-
sions. While our data cannot speak 
to exactly why this is the case, Collins 
and Ringhand39 argue that a primary 
function of the hearings is to both 
shape and entrench the current con-
stitutional consensus, which can be 
accomplished in two ways. First, 
senators attempt to secure nominees' 
agreement with previously controver-
sial decisions that have subsequently 
been absorbed into our constitutional 
canon, such as Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation. Second, senators endeavor to 
shape the constitutional consensus 
by pushing their preferred constitu-
tional decisions in or out of the con-
stitutional canon. This was on vivid 
display at John Roberts' hearing as 
senators debated Roe v. Wade's status 
as a "superprecedent" that warranted 
particular deference.4o 
This second type of questioning 
often incentivizes senators to probe 
nominees on issues more frequently 
associated with the opposing party. 
Indeed, Republican senators asked 
Roberts a higher percentage of ques-
tions about Roe v. Wade than did 
their Democratic counterparts (61% 
to 39%). As such, while civil rights 
issues, such as abortion, are generally 
thought to be owned by the Demo-
cratic Party, Republican senators 
also press nominees on these issues. 
In the case of Roberts, this was done 
to argue that Roe is not a part of the 
current constitutional consensus and 
should not be treated as such. Apply-
ing Collins and Ringhand's argument 
to our findings suggests the need for 
a more nuanced view of issue own-
ership theory in the context of con-
firmation hearing dialogue, one that 
focuses special attention on what 
motivates senators to ask particular 
types of questions. 
Conclusions 
The Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings of Supreme Court nominees 
provide both a check on the presi-
dent's appointment power and the 
only institutionalized opportunity for 
nominees to face a moment of demo-
cratic accountability before they take 
their place on the High Court. Despite 
this, much of the public and schol-
arly discussion of the hearings has 
assumed that they are of little value, 
and there has been scant systematic 
research devoted to understanding 
exactly what happens at the hearings. 
In this article, we investigated one 
particularly significant aspect of the 
hearings: the extent to which hearing 
discourse involves the exploration of 
judiCial decisions. 
Our findings dispute the asser-
37. E.g., John R. Petrocik, William L. Benoit, 
and Glenn J. Hansen, Issue Ownership and Presi-
dential Campaigning, 1952-2000, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 
599 (2003); Ringhand and Collins, supra note 
1, at 627. 
38. E.g., David F. Damore, Issue Convergence 
in Presidential Campaigns, 27 POL. BEHAVIOR 71 
(2005). 
39. Paul M. Collins, Jr. and Lori A. Ringhand, 
"Super Precedents, Litmus Tests, and Supreme 
Court Confirmation Hearings" (2012) (paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago, lllinois). 
40. Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in "Super-
precedent"?, New York Times, October 30, 2005, 
at section 4, column 1. 
tion that nothing generalizable or 
substantial happens at the hearings. 
We reveal that a significant percent-
age of hearing dialogue concerns the 
discussion of court cases. In recent 
decades, one out of every four ques-
tions involves the concrete discussion 
of judicial decisions. Thus, it is clear 
that the hearings have substantive 
content. By pressing nominees on 
judicial decisions, senators are pro-
vided with a powerful mechanism to 
glean the nominees' perspectives on 
salient legal issues, without requir-
ing them to violate the norm of not 
forecasting their positions on future 
legal disputes. And, while senators 
do press nominees on their previous 
judicial decisions,41 the vast majority 
of the cases canvassed at the hear-
ings involve U.S. Supreme Court prec-
edents that the nominees did not play 
a role in shaping. 
Though some seminal centuries-
old decisions are discussed at the 
hearings, most of the cases debated 
involve relatively recent precedents. 
In fact, the majority of cases scruti-
nized at the hearings are less than 
eight years old. As such, our findings 
indicate that hearing colloquy involv-
ing judicial decisions closely repre-
sents the salient legal issues of the era 
in which the nomination hearing takes 
place. We also find that Democratic 
and Republican senators exhibit some 
stark differences in the issues areas 
implicated in the canvassing of judi-
cial decisions. Inasmuch as members 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee can 
utilize their questions to relay their 
constituents' concerns about the 
development of federal law to nomi-
nees,42 it is apparent that senators of 
varying political stripes approach the 
hearings from different perspectives 
on the issues that matter most to their 
pUblics. 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that 
members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee pay close attention to 
judicial decisions and utilize those 
decisions to probe nominees on their 
positions on the significant legal 
issues of the day. This advances our 
41. Williams and Baum, supra note 3. 
42. Ringhand and Collins, supra note 1. 
understanding of the confirmation 
hearings as involving substantive dis-
cussions of contemporary constitu-
tional law, rather than a meaningless 
process dominated by nominee spe-
cific, opportunistic political grand-
standing. While we certainly do not 
deny that such grandstanding occurs, 
this article reveals that a significant 
portion of hearing dialogue is moti-
vated by senatorial concerns about 
constitutional issues exemplified in 
the Court's prior case law. As it is sup-
ported by empirical evidence, rather 
than just anecdotal impressions, this 
finding alone makes a meaningful 
contribution to our understanding of 
the confirmation process. 
The dataset on which this article 
is based, however, also allows us to 
explore these issues even further. 
Using the full range of data collected 
from more than seventy years of con-
firmation hearings will enable us in 
future projects to illustrate the ways in 
which confirmation dialogue follows 
public opinion, thereby allowing the 
public, acting through its elected offi-
cials, to influence the development 
of constitutional law. The discussion 
of case law at the hearings is a key 
component of this broader notion of 
the hearing process as a mechanism 
through which each generation of 
Americans helps to shape the consti-
tutional choices we agree to be gov-
erned by. More fully unearthing the 
connections between public opinion 
and confirmation dialogue will surely 
enhance our appreciation of the sig-
nificance of confirmation hearings in 
American democracy. 
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